NORBERT ELIAS AS ORGANIZATIONAL SOCIOLOGIST Willem Mastenbroek Holland Consulting Group, Amsterdam Department of Economics, Free University, Amsterdam (Working paper, published in 2000) Historical perspective Early army organizations Early capitalism and organizational innovation The essence of the historical development of organizations Theoretical and practical applications Practical models Summary Notes References About the author The study of management and organization offers an ongoing stream of so-called innovations. Reengineering, total quality management, empowerment, outsourcing, core-competencies, organizational architecture and time-based competition are some recent examples. Are these valuable additions to our knowledge or doubtful fashions inspired by trendy business schools or consultants with a keen commercial interest? The stream of innovations is barely influenced or adjusted by contributions from the scientific community. Managers and consultants are unfamiliar with first-class journals such as Administrative Science Quarterly. To practitioners, the theory development that scientists engage in is little more than noncommittal 'armchair philosophy'. Or scientists are so concerned with empirical precision that their detailed research results seem trivial and not very coherent. There is a large gap between theory and practice. In specific fields practical experiences are integrated and published in journals like Harvard Business Review and California Management Review. Although these journals enjoy excellent reputations in Business Schools, they are not really taken seriously by organizational sociology and organizational theory. Norbert Elias (1939, 1994) advocates an historical approach to social phenomena. Can this approach also contribute to theory ànd practice in the field of organization, or is it just another excursion into noncommittal 'armchair' theory? Elias was no organizational sociologist and definitely did not feel great affinity with the activities of managers and consultants. Still, in my opinion, his work can be of great value. A brief description of the historical development of organizations will clarify the concepts useful to capture the most crucial aspects of organizational change. The changes in army organizations as introduced by Maurice will be our arbitrary starting point. We will focus especially on changes in mutual dependencies in connection with the psychological 'habitus' of the people involved. You will see that the concepts which are gradually introduced and clarified have a high 'Elias content'. I will then present some theoretical and practical applications. back to top Historical perspective Early army organizations Let me introduce a man who was an authoritative pioneer in his own time, Prince Maurice of Orange (1567-1625). Armies are among the oldest large-scale organizations. In the period between 1590 and 1600 Maurice introduced a number of innovative organizational principles. His central problem was the discipline of a riotous soldiery against the overwhelming force of the Spanish troups in the Netherlands. Three examples of his interventions: The common formation in the 16th century was the so-called Spanish Brigade: 50 men across and 50 deep. A square formation, completely filled with troups. So most of these men couldn't even use their pikes. Their only function was to provide moral and physical back-up (by pushing!) for the front ranks. Maurice succeeded in greatly increasing the performance of the available troups by introducing a shallow formation. This change in battle-array required major psychological changes. The earlier support of the mass was lost, vulnerability increased. Better training and tighter discipline were intended to result in the required increase in personal effort and self-confidence. Self-confidence was enhanced by, among other things, a thorough training. The use of the musket was based on a precise 'motion-study' of every handling procedure. The 43 (!) separate actions were classified in series of functional acts. Special commands were developed for these acts. Endless practice resulted in independent and fast execution. Brief, clear, and most of all standardized commands were introduced. This style of command required silence from the troups. That was something new. The troups did not only have to be quiet, they also had to learn how to line up in fixed places in organized ranks and files, whereas before, they had been a motley, swarming horde. In all three examples we see a mutually enhancing interaction of increased external discipline and growing individual discipline in terms of self-control and self-confidence. Maurice' military genius sensed exactly where earlier army reforms had failed. He gave shape to an interaction between both mechanisms. This mutual enhancement, consistently maintained over longer periods of training and also in the everyday functioning of the army, resulted in a level of strength never attained before. Victory upon victory was the result. These successes were so impressive, that between 1600 and 1630 most European states adopted Maurice' reforms. Maurice achieved increased tactical flexibility. The massive and inflexible square was replaced by a shallow formation. However, the disappearance of the massive back-up demanded a different type of soldier: one with more discipline and self-confidence, the ability to react instantly to orders, and the ability to retain group cohesion in spite of increased mobility. The French Colonel Ardant du Picq wrote his 'Etude sur le combat' in 1868. In his day, the first quick-firing arms were introduced. To reduce his troops' vulnerability, he pleaded for an open battle-array. Just like in Maurice' situation, this change demanded a different attitude from the soldiers. Ardant du Picq wanted well-trained, relatively small formations: the platoons. The soldiers in these formations had to make good teams and also needed their own responsibility to act. To be able to utilize this responsibility, autonomous thinking and action became important and had to be practiced. Army organizations still wrestle with this problem. Key issue is: to what level of detail should we steer and command versus how much space can we give local commanders. Since 1806 (defeat of Prussian army by Napoleon at Jena), command in the German army has been geared towards this and has been further developed. In this was the 'Auftragstaktik' emerged, which was actually a method of delegation. This command doctrine was recorded by Von Moltke around 1860. Its implementation was a process of gradual perfection that took decades, if not generations. Ogilvie (1995) shows how just misplaced the stereotypical 'Befehl ist Befehl' notion about the German army really is. In the context of 'worauf kommt es eigentlich an' the German army trained its local commanders, up to and including the lowest in rank, to solve problems independently. This was purposely coupled with increasing the autonomy of smaller units and strengthening their internal cohesion. The steady continuity in the development becomes apparent: from Maurice, via Ardant du Picque to the 'Auftragstaktik'! During World War II the Americans had not reached the same level in this combination of central command and autonomous action from tight-knit units. According to Dupuy (1977, p.234-235) this resulted in their casualties being no less than 50% higher in all circumstances than those on the German side. What we see here is the ongoing development of external means of control interacting with increased responsibility of individuals and small groups. Continuous discipline, formalization of behaviour, strengthening of the hierarchy, growing solidarity and increased self-control, coupled with expanding responsibility are the most important behavioural changes in this context. back to top Early capitalism and organizational innovation Our industrial organizations went through similar developments. In his description of the emergence of the factory regime in the 19th century, Iterson (1992, p. 82) wrote: "The problems for the manufacturers were first of all problems of discipline and coordination. Factory regimes are based on a tangled combination of i) coercion (from the side of the manufacturers) and ii) willingness or motivation (on the workers' part)." The discipline which seems so natural to us now, was not in evidence then: "Bringing together men, women and children in one space implied the danger that people would get in each other's way, that arguments could erupt, sexual relations engaged in, or that they would 'overindulge' in other activities which were considered debauched (drinking) or idle (games). Labourers also had to learn to control their language: subversive and obscene utterances also posed a threat to orderly labour and they were fined heavily. The same dangers also existed outside the factory, especially in combination with alcohol consumption. So conformance with the industrial regime was indirectly threatened by `corruption of the morals' in their free time." (Iterson, 1992, p. 83-84) This can be illustrated by the case of the earthenware industry of Josiah Wedgwood (1730-1790), a liberal reformer in public affairs and a patriarchical factory owner in eighteenth century England. During his lifetime he transformed a local pottery, with a dozen men at work, into an international firm . When he started his own firm, called Etruria (Staffordshire), he recruited from his personal network of family and friends two partners with whom he formed a team in which the functions of technique and product innovation, marketing and management of two separate factories, one for useful ware and one for ornamental ware, were integrated. How did Wedgwood find a balance between discipline and motivation? Wedgwood had two disciplinary adages: To make Artists ...(of)... mere men and second to 'make such machines of Men as cannot err'. First he concentrated all workers in one general workplace and held to his original 'scheme of keeping each workshop separate'. They were not allowed to wander around as they were used to doing in the traditional workplaces. At the same time the work was original in such a way that there was a smooth progression from the ware being painted, to being entered into the books to being stored'. (McKendrick, 1961, p. 32) By doing so he heightened the interdependence of his workers and at the same time gave them some task autonomy in separate places. But the traditional 'careless habits of the older generations' presented an ongoing problem in the development of high-quality production for the new markets. Wedgwood had to fight a long local tradition of 'customs in common', in particular the 'stoppages for Wakes', (a local annual feast lasting several days and nights which were spent eating and drinking intemperately and 'fornicating'), but he also had to combat 'waste', 'idleness', 'the bane of drinking', 'working by the rule of thumb', 'inefficiency', 'arbitrariness', 'irregularity', (McKendrick, 1961, p. 38). His own personal control over his men was effective enough. But he was 'forced with increasing frequency to leave them 'without any head to look after them' (McKendrick, 1961, p. 39). There was no tradition of supervision in his factory in his absence. For instance when he put an older worker in charge, it turned out that this man lacked authority, due to his familiarity with colleagues. The resulting informality 'lapsed too easily to irregularity'. An example Wedgwood described to Bentley: " Daniel does pretty well at work and I am here every day, but he often leaves the work and drinks two or three days together, and has no taste to direct at any time" (McKendrick, 1961, p. 39). The problem was not only the absence of Wedgwood himself, it was also the growing complexity (more workers, more tasks, all kinds of interdependencies). Wedgwood wrote to Bentley comparing the small-scale pottery with his own firm: "To keep 150 hands of various professions and more various tempers and dispositions, in tolerable order was a more difficult task " (McKendrick, 1961, p. 39). Wedgwood solved his problem by introducing functions with responsibility to 'one steady man' for each process - the 'Clerk of the Manufactory', the 'Clerk of Weights and Measures', the 'Porter and General Inspectors' - to 'look after the men and wages'. For all task and supervising functions he formalized his disciplinary rules by writing them down in the Potters Instructions (1780) and in the 'Common Place Book'. Some examples of external rules and regulations and sanctions for enhancing and steering the regulation of self control: "Any person seen throwing within the yard of this manufactory forfits 2s.6d,..", "any workman strikeing or otherwise abuseing an overlooker to lose his or there place..", any workman conveying Ale or Licquor into the manufactory in working hours forfits 2s...", "any person playing at fives against any of the walls where there are windows forfits 2s.." (McKendrick, 1961, p. 45). McKendrick summarizes the 'instructions and regulations': "They cover every aspect of factory discipline. Containing a remarkably detailed knowledge of every workshop and every process, the Instructions recognize all the minor techniques, the tricks and petty evasions of the idle workman". In this way Wedgwood armed his overseers with the experience, his knowledge of prevalent faults and his remedies. They also provided clear instructions on 'how to show marks of approbation' to the skilful and the punctual and how 'to reprimand those more slovenly and careless'. (McKendrick, 1961, p. 40). Wedgwood lacked trained, specialized painters and modellers. So it was not easy 'to make Artists ...(of)...mere men', just as it was not possible 'to make such machines of Men as cannot err'. He contracted well-known artists from 'outside'. But these artists disappointed him. They had a disrupting influence on factory discipline: they proved too lofty for the factory system or were selling industrial secrets or worked not hard enough and were idle (McKendrick, 1961, p. 36). Wedgwood separated their activities from the rest of the factory labourers and contracted them for buying and/or commissioning their designs by piece. In that way the artists, in fact, 'submitted to a discipline hardly less stringent than the common workmen'. (McKendrick, 1961, p. 37). The other side of this sometimes harsh regime was that Wedgwood offered his workers housing and care for the sick. That was not only out of economical reckoning. He felt a moral obligation. He wanted to improve his workmen's lot. He was concerned with civilizing their behaviour and educating them to discipline and self-respect. 'Liberal but unsophisticated in his ideals, he felt that his workmen should be disciplined for their own good and offered security in return for obedience' (McKendrick, 1961, p. 50). The remarks of Iterson (1992, p. 82) that early factory regimes are based on a tangled combination of coercion (from the side of the entrepreneur) and willingness (on the workers part) are illustrated by these examples. Also we witnessed a process of trial and error towards an articulation of interdependency as well as autonomy in factory relations. Taylor, the founder of scientific management (1856-1915), made a contribution to organizational science that fits well into this perspective His methods were largely intended to impose discipline on the activities of subordinates, something which was sorely needed as far as Taylor was concerned. He gave many descriptions of how employees managed to restrict production by 'soldiering or loafing'. (Taylor, 1947, pp. 19-24). He repeatedly stated that his 'scientific method', using individual training, separation, special reward systems and other measures, could gradually overcome these tendencies (Taylor, 1947, pp. 32, 34, 69, 72-74). Taylor vividly described his experiences as a foreman in a steelworks: No one who has not had this experience can have an idea of the bitterness which is gradually developed in such a struggle .... And there are few foremen indeed who were able to stand up against the combined pressure of all the men in the shop .... If the writer had been one of the workmen, and had lived where they lived, they would have brought such social pressure to bear upon him that it would have been impossible to have stood out against them (Taylor, 1947, pp. 50-51). From these tumultuous experiences Taylor distilled his, as he called it, 'scientific management' (Taylor, 1947, pp. 52-53). His experiences provide a good impression of how personal power can be replaced by more 'neutral' mechanisms. Despite the strong resistance Taylor encountered, his methods were introduced on a large scale. This was possible because of the much greater power of management. At the same time management was forced to exploit this power surplus due to the fierce competition with other companies. Taylor's own intentions were entirely different. He believed that the interests of employers and workers were essentially the same. 'The great mental revolution which occurs under scientific management' would do away with contention and antagonism and replace them with 'friendly co-operation and mutual helpfulness'. Maybe we can see this idealistic dream as a forerunner of the more recent images of the learning organization, empowerment and shared values. back to top The essence of the historical development of organizations The progressive extension and condensation of dependencies within and between organizations raise problems with regard to coordination and flexibility: If we cannot combine these increasing interdependencies with the right kind of self-organization, the result will be increased rigidity. It is especially interesting that in conjunction with a growing self-control, new opportunities for entrepreneurial initiative emerge while the risks of disorganization are kept under control. In his description of the organization phenomenon, Van Doorn distinguishes the `late-organizational stage' in which he observes a shift from social control to self-motivation. This, however, does not imply a shift to chaotic individualism or anarchy. `On the contrary, the realization of this social control has only become really possible in a societal structure, whose members have learned through the centuries to - in psycho-analytical terms - regulate their drives.' (van Doorn, 1956, p. 200). Van Doorn observes that in this phase direct external control has been replaced by more indirect, more subtle binding agents and a greater evenness and allroundness of restraints. According to Van Doorn it is the combination of this all-round control and the internalization in terms of self-discipline and a sense of responsibility that makes the `late-organizational stage' possible. This is an explicit link with the work of Elias (1939). Van Doorn remains a bit vague about the nature of `all-round control and control mechanisms'. Nevertheless, he clearly sees the link with self-discipline. He also makes the connection with Mannheim's principles of `self-rationalization' and `self-organization' (Mannheim 1935/1940, p. 55-57). So the skill of self-organization, which has been so highly praised and recommended recently, turns out to have a long history. Apparently we have become more successful over the centuries at combining a wide array of steering and coordination mechanisms with bigger opportunities for autonomous functioning. We could even say that organizations which develop a more articulate balance, either by accident or thanks to the intuition of a talented leader, gain a substantial competitive advantage. The balance of steering - self-organization (figure 1) evolves over the centuries. The need for detailed daily supervision decreases as self-control increases. But self-control does not increase automatically. It takes pressure and coercion by co-workers and superiors, and increasing interdependency in the relationships between units to let this become 'second nature'. Steering then shifts to output norms, and after that to factors such as quality and customer orientation. At present, self-organization is exacted in areas like entrepreneurship and joint result responsibility. In each case it is a question of the interaction between the extremes of steering and self-organization. A certain acceleration in this development, as we saw with Maurice and Wedgwood, benefits the clout and competitive strength. Note, however, that a balance can also be out of balance and favour one side for long periods of time. In the days of Wedgwood the balance was more severely tilted than it is today in Western organizations. Over the centuries this balance has moved towards a more horizontal position. This development is connected with the increasing mutual dependency in relations between 'those who steer' and 'those who are steered'. Figure 1 The steering - self-organization balance Stronger interdependence, more steering <== versus ==> More autonomy, more self organization There are several levels of abstraction to this concept (or, to follow Elias terminology: several levels of synthesis). At the more concrete level there is the tension between departments and the management of the organization, and between subsidiaries and the management of the business unit. It is also expressed in the central - decentral balance in every organization. In more general terms: an organizational unit has its own interests, but there are also all kinds of mutual dependencies with other units. There is autonomy ànd interdependency. The 'autonomy - interdependency' tension balance is the most abstract variant of this concept. 'Steering - self-organization' is already more specific. And 'central - decentral', for example, is even closer to concrete phenomena. back to top Theoretical and practical applications Organizations are seen here as changing configurations of relations. The changing tension balances in these relations are clarified by means of the historical perspective. Over the ages up until our time we see a gradual development towards more and stronger interdependence and steering as well as more autonomy and self-organization. External controls become internalized as self-discipline. This higher level of self-organization and autonomy enables more adequate steering. Gradually, the ability of organizations to deal with complexity improves. We are talking about processes of managerial and organizational civilization. The steering and coercion towards more discipline and a stronger sense of responsibility are internalized. This in turn provides possibilities for more autonomy. Gradually, direct supervision and attention are reduced. Steering efforts can then be focused on restraints that are not yet internalized. At present, for example, we observe in some organizations that the relatively autonomous organizational units are forced into an attitude of mutual exchange and openness. Learning from one another, initially heavily managed and monitored from the top and gradually driven by more autonomous action, enables a further strengthening of competitive power. More and more organizations are attempting to incorporate this type of steering. (Senge, 1990; Evans, 1991) An historical perspective makes it possible to better capture the essence of organizational changes. It functions as a sound means of orientation to find one's bearings in the chaos of change. The materials presented above show how change relates to the changing tension balance of 'steering - self-organization'. There is a great need for such orientating concepts because the turbulence created by specific changes makes it difficult to see the wood for the trees. Our knowledge in the area of organization and management is still very much fashion driven: Reengineering, empowerment, the learning organization, shared values and chaos management are but a few of the 'breakthroughs' and 'innovations' we have enjoyed in the past five years. A sound concept makes it possible to see beyond the trends and fads. We then see a historical process of trial and error, a process which shows a structure. This structure provides a framework. Specific facts and events remain 'loose' not to say 'lost' if they can not be connected in a larger framework. An awareness of the structures or patterns in historical processes provides us with a criterion of relevance to guide us amidst the confusing turbulence of events and trends.1) Some recent recommendations on management and organization fit clearly in the pattern as described above. These will have the best chances of survival. Take for instance recommendations such as integration of functions into forms varying from autonomous task units to business units and more responsibility for one's 'own' products and customers. The idea of strengthening the central - decentral balance also has a place here: A stronger centralism on a limited number of critical areas can actually be combined with a higher degree of autonomy of organizational units. We also see more clearly the defects in recent trends like 'empowerment' without good steering, or top-down 'reengineering' without the active involvement of the basic units. Are such orientating concepts not already available in organizational sociology? So far only on a very limited scale, although some impulses in that direction can be detected. The classic work of Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) is a good example. They observe in organizations processes of both integration ànd differentiation. This dual movement receives much attention, although they do not use an historical perspective. Historically speaking it is interesting that by now the mechanisms of differentiation and integration as described by them 30 years ago, show a clear development. For Lawrence and Lorsch the dominant type of differentiation is that into functions such as Purchasing, Sales, Production, R&D. They do not yet differentiate into units based on product/market categories, whereas the units which are now emerging in the shape of autonomous task forces, profit centres and result areas are functionally integrated. This means that attempts are made to reintegrate links in the production chain into units. In this way more shared responsibility is established in larger parts of the production process. This development is another example of both increasing interdependency ànd stronger autonomy; or, speaking with Lawrence and Lorsch: a further differentiation coupled with a higher level of integration. The integration mechanisms dominant in their work - formal regulations, coordinating institutions, informal contacts and conflict handling - are also found, more fully elaborated, in another classic by Mintzberg, in the form of the 5 (and later 6) coordinating mechanisms which are the foundation of Mintzberg's typology. With a little good will we can consider this typology a series of organization designs in which the autonomy of units is gradually given more opportunity through a better utilization of the coordinating mechanisms. For example, strict supervision decreases, shared values become stronger. We can also detect traces of an historical perspective in the stages of growth and development which Greiner (1972) and Scott (1970) observe organizations going through. Other impulses we find in the work of Weber (1947) who emphasizes the mixed nature of social relations, and Gouldner (1954) who already writes about the paradox that more room for parties to pursue their own interests makes the organization as a whole more enduring. This is in line with what Lammers (1983) calls the dual nature of organizations. "It is simultaneously a cooperative system and a market plus arena." Still, despite these initiatives by Weber, Gouldner and Lawrence and Lorsch, organizational sociology lacks integrated concepts which accommodate both the parties and the systems models. Elias' work makes it possible to turn this dual character into the cornerstone of an organizational-sociological theory. He describes how the parties model and the systems model can be viewed as stages in our thinking about human relations in connection with the development of increasingly complex networks (Elias, 1971, p.99). As the networks they are part of become increasingly complex, players develop new concepts. Elias (1971, p. 99) pointed out that the 'players' in increasingly complex networks gradually alter their ideas about the course of the game: "Rather than reducing the course of the game to individual moves, their assimilation of events gradually starts to develop into more impersonal concepts that take more account of the relative autonomy of the players than of the motives of individual players. But working out such vehicles to accomodate the increasing awareness that the course of the game is uncontrollable for the players themselves is a long and arduous process. The comparisons people use constantly shift back and forth between the idea that the course of the game can be reduced to the actions of individual players, and the idea that there is something superhuman about it. For a long time it has been extremely difficult for the players to understand that the uncontrollability of the course of the game for them, which they readily perceive as something 'superhuman', results from their mutual dependency, from being interdependent as players and from the tensions and conflicts that go along with this". "The action theories do not come to grips with the questions brought up here of the nature of human interdependencies and of power balances and their implications. At most, they simply assume that intentional interactions have unintended consequences. But they obscure the fact central to the theory and practice of sociology that every intentional interaction is based on unintended human interdependencies ." (Elias, 1971, p. 103). And a little further on: "a game which is the exclusive result of the interaction of the individual moves of many players takes a course that none of the individual players intended, determined or foresaw, so that precisely the reverse is true: it is the unintentional course of the game that determines the moves of the individual players." (Elias, 1971, p. 103) So we may see both parties and systems models as a typical phase in the development of our thinking which parallels the development of more complex networks.2) The work of Elias contributes to the integration of parties and system models into a 'parties in a system' model. Elsewhere, I have elaborated this view (Mastenbroek 1991, 1993). Crucial is the concept of the tension-balance because it encompasses the dual nature of organizations. This is not only a better theoretical concept, it also provides a better practical model. back to top Practical models Practice-oriented authors often come up with organization models ordered around a few basic categories: The categories used most frequently are strategy, structure, culture and information systems (Figure 2). Some authors add categories such as technology, human resources and leadership. One of the best-known models of this kind is the 7S model introduced by Peters and Waterman (1982). These models provide for a neat clustering of important factors. They are much used by managers and consultants. At the same time they show some serious limitations. One problem is of an analytical nature. The various elements are difficult to separate. A way of working, does that come under culture, under structure or under strategy? If it is defined in terms of delineation of tasks and procedures, we call it structure. But if it is not formalised in this manner, does that mean it is culture? If it is proclaimed by the top, do we call it strategy or maybe 'shared values'? Figure 2 A practitioner's model. An even more important problem concerns the way in which the separate elements are linked. Authors design boxes with arrows and connecting lines. What do these arrows and lines stand for? This remains obscure. Specific relationships and influences are suggested. The 'what' and 'how' remain implicit. This problem is all the more urgent because the everyday practice of organizations often entails a multitude of changes: not only developing a clearer strategy, but also structural adjustments, ànd information projects, ànd changes in management style, ànd quality actions. How can we make all this into a coherent whole? How do we ensure that the separate changes fit into an integrative framework? How do we gain such a clear understanding of their relationship that we can make sure they complement and reinforce each other, and that we do not steer them as separate processes? The models in question are too shallow to accomplish this. Despite these disadvantages and despite their weak academic reputation, these models are used frequently. Apparently they have much more to offer to practitioners than the more sophisticated, scientific models which are available. One of the advantages they offer is a simple and elegant way to arrange important issues and processes. This classification may be primitive, more like a checklist of categories. And it may also be rather crude: categories overlap, and there may be a lack of understanding the relations between categories and more basic processes. Nevertheless, it is a classification, and it provides an overview in understandable terms. So, for instance, many recent incentives for organizational succes fit in easily. Figure 3 Incentives for organizational success (1) If we are concerned with the way in which strategy, structure, culture and information systems influence each other, the concept of inter-dependencies provides promising possibilities. Structure and culture are both characteristics of interdependencies; structure in a formalised way, culture more in terms of attitudes and perceptions. Strategy and information systems also give shape to interdependencies. For us, organizational design is arranging interdependencies in such a way that both the autonomy and the interdependency of units are reinforced in a sound balance. In this way an understanding of the relation between separate changes becomes possible. From this concept, a reordering of the incentives for organizational success (as described in figure 3) leads to the classification as expressed in figure 4. Figure 4 Incentives for organizational success (2). This reshuffling shows more clearly how things fit together. The separate elements under the headings strategy, structure, culture and information system can be ordered in a more meaningful way on the basis of their impact on the autonomy-interdependency balance. More meaningful because this makes it easier to show how elements can be designed in a coherent and mutually reinforcing way. More meaningful also because of the more direct relationship with the crucial issues of less complexity and more competitive strength. Elias focuses our attention to this deeper and more integrative level of understanding: organizations are to be viewed from a dynamic relational perspective. From this perspective many recent recommendations begin to gain importance. It becomes easier to see more structure in actual developments. In line with the historical articulation of autonomy as well as interdependency, organizations are becoming more and more networks of units that are free to act while retaining links to one another. Units are autonomous, while cultivating simultaneously those interdependencies that give them a competitive edge. In addition, organizations rely on more horizontal market-like coordination mechanisms. One of the most important is continuous feedback on results. This gives a different substance to the relationship of centralized to decentralized. The swing of the pendulum from central to decentral becomes a dynamic tension balance of both central and decentral. The direction in which the network moves and the quality of relations within it are shaped by the more central units, but the units also show responsibility for this. The horizontal exchange and coordination in particular, demand that every unit be an active network member. This theme is repeated within units: Teams are effective only if they know they are responsible for the organizational unit; individuals can be prominent only if they feel a responsibility for the team of which they are a part. Sharing ánd stimulating, cooperation ánd competition, are other recent expressions of the same tension-balance. Mutual exchange, learning from each other and also prodding each other have a mobilizing effect. Revans (1983) uses this idea to make organizations more competitive with remarkable results. His point of departure is refreshing. Managers learn most from other managers, and in particular from those who struggle with the same problems. Revans called this `Action-Learning'. We now refer to it with a term like `The learning organization'. This learning from one another is often obstructed by awkward mutual communication and a lack of openness and trust. From this perspective, Evans (1991) hits the mark when he makes the building of personal relationships and the systematic development of openness and easy communication the cornerstone of his approach to management development. The importance of this concept cannot be separated from the growing number of organizations that more and more clearly derive competitive strength from combinations of apparently conflicting organizational principles. Like Maurice and Wedgwood these organizations are experimenting with a further articulation of autonomy as well as interdependency. They try to function both central ànd decentral, 'loose ànd tight', small ànd large. Central involvement is limited to a few essential exchanges and dependencies in only a few areas. Which areas these are depends on what would yield competitive advantage in specific markets. Sometimes it will be economies of scale combined with production-technological virtuosity. Sometimes a central 'New Business Development'. Sometimes a standardized shop formula, coupled with a central purchasing organization. The organizational design of `small-in-large', as a network of relatively autonomous units, blends into network organizations in which the units also retain their autonomy as independent firms in various degrees. There are entrepreneurs who find their strength primarily in organizing such networks. Take for example the following situation: an ice hockey helmet is designed in Scandinavia, made ready for production and tuned to the demands of the global market in the US, it is produced in Korea and distributed from Japan. Miles (1989) presents a series of examples of such network organizations in the fashion industry, the film industry and publishing companies. In itself such a network organization is not new. The new element is the diffusion of this model to an increasing number of market sectors. Are these complex designs? Not really. The underlying pattern is quite simple. Strengthening coordinating power ànd developing maximum self-organization of units. back to top Summary An historical perspective on organizations makes the steering - self-organization tension balance stand out as an essential aspect of competitive strength. The process in which steering and self-organization are gradually taking shape in organizations has been going on for centuries. New types of organizations are not new, they are recent variations on an old theme: Try to strengthen the coordinating power on the most critical aspects by also increasing the self-organization of units. Recent expressions deviate considerably from what Taylor came up with a hundred years ago. No wonder. In his day the focus was primarily on designing types of organizations to condition the discipline of employees. The increase of discipline - enforced at first, later becoming second nature - in turn enabled the emergence of more stable and denser relational networks within and between organizations. Increased competition and the growing density of interdependencies now make co-responsibility and initiative imperative. Organization design evolves further. Seeing this historical development directs our attention to the key factors of organizational change. The never ending stream of fads and fashions from the practices of management and organization contributes mainly to confusion. Organizational sociology, which distinguishes parties and systems models, also threatens to put us on the wrong track by utilizing competitive and mutually exclusive views on organizations as either market and arena or as cooperative systems. The dual nature of organizational relations is the key characteristic of organizations. Concepts that give this dual nature a central position and integrate it in one perspective can help us make some progress. The work of Elias provides an important contribution. Comments and suggestions are welcome. E-mail wil_mbk1@euronet.nl back to top Notes This statement about the structures or patterns of historical processes, covers something of great relevance but is also very controversial. In the social sciences it seems as if only the facts and figures of today have relevance. Historical studies have the ring of tales from the past. As anecdotical evidence maybe of some odd interest . On top of this already unfamiliar approach is added the concept of structure in a process; meaning that processes may take a discernible - though unplanned - direction over time. Even to historians this is a very disputed idea. Every generation writes its own history and every generation uses its own logic, isn't it!? Current postmodernism with its emphasis on relativism makes the idea of a possible progression in the reality-orientation of the social sciences also very doubtful. Elias firmly challanged these positions. With only very limited effects up until now. An awareness of the unsatisfactory state of the social sciences may pave the way for a reappraisal of our current standards. This brief epistemological examination touches the foundations of our thinking about organizations. Scientists disagree thoroughly on this. Concepts based on the natural sciences such as open-system theory and chaos theory clash with another powerful school of thought, which emphasizes the voluntary nature of human relations. Until now the prestige of the natural sciences provided the systems theories with a considerable advantage in this battle. Elias distances himself from both of these approaches. People can only be understood in terms of the changing relationships they form with each other. That means an historical perspective and an emphasis on important relational aspects such as power and dependency. back to top References Doorn, J.A.A. (1956) Sociologie van de Organisatie. Leiden: Stenfert Kroese. Dupuy, T.N. 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Oxford: University Press. back to top About the author Willem Mastenbroek, Ph.D., is professor of Organizational Culture and Communication at the Department of Economics of the Free University of Amsterdam. He has authored numerous articles and books, including Conflict Management and Organization Development (Wiley, 1993) and Managing for Quality in the Service Sector (Blackwell, 1991). Mastenbroek is partner of Holland Consulting Group in Amsterdam. He is engaged in improvement of results (quality, profitability, client orientation, innovative capacity) often in relation with structural and cultural changes. Willem Mastenbroek Telephone: 00-31-(0)23-5471583 Fax: 00-31-(0)23-5471586 E-mail: wil_mbk1@euronet.nl